Mon, 07 Aug 2017 22:22:28 +0900 ssh: unban the use of pipe character in user@host:port string stable 4.3.1
Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org> [Mon, 07 Aug 2017 22:22:28 +0900] rev 33660
ssh: unban the use of pipe character in user@host:port string This vulnerability was fixed by the previous patch and there were more ways to exploit than using '|shellcmd'. So it doesn't make sense to reject only pipe character. Test cases are updated to actually try to exploit the bug. As the SSH bridge of git/svn subrepos are not managed by our code, the tests for non-hg subrepos are just removed. This may be folded into the original patches.
Fri, 04 Aug 2017 23:54:12 -0700 ssh: quote parameters using shellquote (SEC) stable
Jun Wu <quark@fb.com> [Fri, 04 Aug 2017 23:54:12 -0700] rev 33659
ssh: quote parameters using shellquote (SEC) This patch uses shellquote to quote ssh parameters more strictly to avoid shell injection.
Mon, 31 Jul 2017 14:55:11 -0700 subrepo: add tests for git rogue ssh urls (SEC) stable
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Mon, 31 Jul 2017 14:55:11 -0700] rev 33658
subrepo: add tests for git rogue ssh urls (SEC) 'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:44:17 -0700 subrepo: add tests for svn rogue ssh urls (SEC) stable
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:44:17 -0700] rev 33657
subrepo: add tests for svn rogue ssh urls (SEC) 'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:04:44 -0700 subrepo: add tests for hg rogue ssh urls (SEC) stable
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:04:44 -0700] rev 33656
subrepo: add tests for hg rogue ssh urls (SEC) 'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
Mon, 31 Jul 2017 14:40:28 -0700 push: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC) stable
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Mon, 31 Jul 2017 14:40:28 -0700] rev 33655
push: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC)
Fri, 28 Jul 2017 16:47:32 -0700 pull: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC) stable
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Fri, 28 Jul 2017 16:47:32 -0700] rev 33654
pull: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC)
Fri, 28 Jul 2017 16:36:36 -0700 clone: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC) stable
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Fri, 28 Jul 2017 16:36:36 -0700] rev 33653
clone: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC)
Tue, 01 Aug 2017 14:40:19 -0700 sshpeer: check for safe ssh url (SEC) stable
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Tue, 01 Aug 2017 14:40:19 -0700] rev 33652
sshpeer: check for safe ssh url (SEC) Checking in the sshpeer for a rogue ssh:// urls seems like the right place to do it (instead of whack-a-mole with pull, clone, push, etc).
Fri, 04 Aug 2017 14:00:03 -0400 ssh: ban any username@host or host that starts with - (SEC) stable
Augie Fackler <augie@google.com> [Fri, 04 Aug 2017 14:00:03 -0400] rev 33651
ssh: ban any username@host or host that starts with - (SEC) This paranoia probably isn't required, but it can't hurt either.
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