dispatch: protect against malicious 'hg serve --stdio' invocations (sec) Some shared-ssh installations assume that 'hg serve --stdio' is a safe command to run for minimally trusted users. Unfortunately, the messy implementation of argument parsing here meant that trying to access a repo named '--debugger' would give the user a pdb prompt, thereby sidestepping any hoped-for sandboxing. Serving repositories over HTTP(S) is unaffected. We're not currently hardening any subcommands other than 'serve'. If your service exposes other commands to users with arbitrary repository names, it is imperative that you defend against repository names of '--debugger' and anything starting with '--config'. The read-only mode of hg-ssh stopped working because it provided its hook configuration to "hg serve --stdio" via --config parameter. This is banned for security reasons now. This patch switches it to directly call ui.setconfig(). If your custom hosting infrastructure relies on passing --config to "hg serve --stdio", you'll need to find a different way to get that configuration into Mercurial, either by using ui.setconfig() as hg-ssh does in this patch, or by placing an hgrc file someplace where Mercurial will read it. mitrandir@fb.com provided some extra fixes for the dispatch code and for hg-ssh in places that I overlooked.

#ifndef _HG_BDIFF_H_
#define _HG_BDIFF_H_

struct bdiff_line {
	int hash, n, e;
	ssize_t len;
	const char *l;
};

struct bdiff_hunk;
struct bdiff_hunk {
	int a1, a2, b1, b2;
	struct bdiff_hunk *next;
};

int bdiff_splitlines(const char *a, ssize_t len, struct bdiff_line **lr);
int bdiff_diff(struct bdiff_line *a, int an, struct bdiff_line *b, int bn,
	struct bdiff_hunk *base);
void bdiff_freehunks(struct bdiff_hunk *l);

#endif